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Decision making is often considered to arise out of
contributions from a model-free habitual system
and a model-based goal-directed system. Here, we
investigated the effect of a dopamine manipulation
on the degree to which either system contributes to
instrumental behavior in a two-stage Markov deci-
sion task, which has been shown to discriminate
model-free from model-based control. We found
increased dopamine levels promote model-based
over model-free choice.
INTRODUCTION
An overarching view of adaptive behavior is that humans and
animals act to maximize reward and minimize punishment as
a consequence of their choices. There are multiple ways this
can be realized, and mounting evidence indicates model-based
and model-free forms of reinforcement learning (RL) contribute
to behavioral control (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010; Boureau
and Dayan, 2011; Daw et al., 2005; Doya, 1999; Redgrave
et al., 2010; Wunderlich et al., 2012). Model-free RL learns the
course of action leading to maximum long-run reward through
a temporal difference (TD) prediction error teaching signal
(Montague et al., 1996). By comparison, model-based choice
involves forward planning, inwhich an agent searches a cognitive
model of the environment to find the same optimal actions (Dick-
inson and Balleine, 2002).
An unresolved question is whether neuromodulatory systems
implicated in value-based decision making, specifically dopa-
mine, impact on the degree to which one or the other controller
is dominant in choice behavior. Phasic firing of dopaminergic
VTA neurons encodes reward prediction errors in reinforcement
learning (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998; Schultz et al., 1997).
In humans, drugs enhancing dopaminergic function (e.g.,
L-DOPA) augment a striatal signal that expresses reward predic-
tion errors during instrumental learning and, in so doing,
increases the likelihood of choosing stimuli associated with
greater monetary gains (Bo´di et al., 2009; Frank et al., 2004; Pes-
siglione et al., 2006).
While previous research has focused on the role of dopamine
in model-free learning, and value updating via reward prediction
errors, its role in model-based choice remains poorly under-418 Neuron 75, 418–424, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.stood. For example, it is unknown if and how dopamine impacts
on performance in model-based decisions and on the arbitration
between model-based and model-free controllers. This is the
question we address in the present study, in which we formally
test whether dopamine influences the degree to which behavior
is governed by either control system.RESULTS
We studied 18 subjects on a two-stage Markov decision task
after being treated with Madopar (150 mg L-DOPA plus
37.5 mg benserazide) or a placebo in a double-blind, fully coun-
terbalanced, repeated-measures design. We used a task previ-
ously shown to distinguish model-based and model-free
components of human behavior and in which subjects’ choices
pertain to a mixture of both systems (Daw et al., 2011). These
properties render this task optimally suited to test the influence
of a pharmacological manipulation on the degree to which
choice performance expresses model-based or model-free
control.
In each trial, subjects made an initial choice between two
fractal stimuli, leading to either of two second-stage states in
which they made another choice between two different stimuli
(see Figures 1A and 1B). Each of the four second-stage stimuli
was associated with probabilistic monetary reward. To incen-
tivize subjects to continue learning throughout the task, we
changed these probabilities slowly and independently accord-
ing to Gaussian random walks. The choice of each stimulus on
the first stage led predominantly (70% of the time) to one of
the two associated second-stage states, a relationship that
was fixed throughout the experiment. The logic of the task
was that a dependence on model-based or model-free strate-
gies predicts different patterns by which feedback obtained
after the second stage should impact future first-stage
choices.
We first considered stay-switch behavior as a minimally con-
strained approach to dissociate model-based and model-free
control. A model-free reinforcement learning strategy predicts
a main effect of reward on stay probability. This is because
model-free choice works without considering structure in the
environment; hence, rewarded choices are more likely to be
repeated, regardless of whether that reward followed a common
or rare transition. A reward after an uncommon transition would
therefore adversely increase the value of the chosen first-stage
cue without updating the value of the unchosen cue. In contrast,
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C Figure 1. Task Design
Task. (A) On every trial, a choice between two
stimuli (left-right randomized) led probabilistically
to one of two second-stage states, each of which
then demanded another choice between two
different stimulus pairs. Importantly, each first-
stage stimulus was more strongly (70% versus
30%) associated with a particular second-stage
state throughout the experiment, imposing a task
structure that could be exploited in model-based
choice. All stimuli in stage 2 were associated with
probabilistic reward, which changed slowly and
independently according to Gaussian random
walks. This forced subjects to continuously learn
and explore the second-stage choices throughout
the experiment. (B) Timings in a single trial. (C)
Model-based and model-free strategies for RL
predict different patterns by which outcomes
experienced after the second stage should impact
first-stage choices on subsequent trials (based on
Daw et al., 2011). If choices were driven by the
model-free system, then a reward should increase
the likelihood of choosing the same stimulus
on the next trial, regardless of the type of
transition (left). Alternatively, if choices were driven
by a model-based system, we would expect
an interaction between transition type and
reward (right).
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tion between the two factors, because a rare transition inverts
the effect of a subsequent reward (Figure 1C). Under model-
based control, receiving a reward after an uncommon transition
increases the propensity to switch. This is because the rewarded
second-stage stimulus can be more reliably accessed by
choosing the rejected first-stage cue than by choosing the
same cue again.
Using repeated-measures ANOVA, we examined the proba-
bility of staying or switching at the first stage dependent on
drug state (L-DOPA or placebo), reward on previous trial (reward
or no reward), and transition type on previous trial (common or
uncommon) (see Figure 2A). A significant main effect of reward,
F(1,17) = 23.3, p < 0.001, demonstrates amodel-free component
in behavior (i.e., reward increases stay probability regardless of
the transition type). A significant interaction between reward
and transition, F(1,17) = 9.75, p = 0.006, reveals a model-based
component (i.e., subjects also take the task structure into
account). These results show both a direct reinforcement effect
(model-free) and an effect of task structure (model-based) and
replicate previous findings (Daw et al., 2011).
The key analyses here concernedwhether L-DOPAmodulated
choice propensities. Critically, we observed a significant drug 3
reward3 transition interaction, F(1,17) = 9.86, p = 0.006, reflect-
ing increased model-based behavior under L-DOPA treatment.
We also observed a main effect of the drug, F(1,17) = 7.04,
p = 0.017, showing that subjects are less perseverative under
L-DOPA treatment. Interactions between drug and transition,
F(1,17) = 4.09, p = 0.06, or drug and reward (which would indi-cate a drug-induced change in model-free control), F(1,17) =
1.10, p = 0.31, were not significant.
Figure 2B shows the difference in stay probability between
drug states corrected for a main effect of drug. Note that dopa-
mine treatment particularly affected choices after unrewarded
trials and a post hoc contrast; testing for a differential drug effect
after unrewarded compared to rewarded trials confirmed this
was significant, F(1,17) = 12.68, p = 0.002. Figures 2C–2F illus-
trate how a number of hypothesized effects of L-DOPA might
manifest itself in a stay-switch analysis (see Figure S1 available
online for a validation of these hypotheses using computational
modeling). Qualitatively, the data in Figure 2B resemble a shift
toward model-based control, most notable after unrewarded
trials. In contrast, our results do not resemble any of the putative
model hypotheses that invoke modulation of a model-free
system.
Given the broad effects of drug in this analysis, we next
employed computational modeling to provide an in-depth under-
standing of this pharmacological effect. The value of using such
an approach is that a stay-switch analysis only considers vari-
ables on trial n  1, while a computational model encompasses
an integration over a longer reward history and attributes any
behavioral change to a specific computational process.
Model comparisons (Table S2) between a fully parameterized
hybrid model (Daw et al., 2011; Gla¨scher et al., 2010) and
various reduced nested versions favored a model with the
parameters learning rate a, softmax temperature b, persever-
ance p, and relative degree of model-based/model-free control
u as best fit. We then fitted parameters individually for eachNeuron 75, 418–424, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 419
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Figure 2. Results Stay-Switch Analysis
(A) Subjects’ task behavior showed characteristics of both model-free
and model-based influences, demonstrating that subjects combined both
strategies in the task. The reward 3 transition interaction (a measure of the
extent to which subjects consider the task structure) was significantly larger in
L-DOPA compared to placebo, indicating stronger model-based behavior.
Error bars represent SEM. (B) Difference in stay probability between L-DOPA
and placebo condition, corrected for the main effect of drug. The observed
interaction indicates a shift toward model-based choice (see F) but shows no
resemblance to any of the three effects implicating the model-free system
(see C–E). (C–F) Illustration of expected differences in stay probability for
hypothetical drug effects. See Figure S1 and Table S1 for validation of these
hypotheses. (C) Trials after uncommon transitions (second and fourth bar)
are discriminatory between model-free and model-based choice, whereas
both models make equal predictions for trials after common transitions
(cf. Figure 1C). A shift toward model-free control would be indicated by an
increased propensity to stay with the chosen pattern after uncommon re-
warded trials and an increase in switching after uncommon unrewarded trials.
(D) Stronger or faster model-free learning would increase the reward-depen-
dent effect and be expressed as a general increase to stay after rewarded trials
and general decrease to stay after unrewarded trials. (E) A selective
enhancement of positive updating paired with impairment in negative updating
might not change mean-corrected stay probabilities. This is because
enhanced positive updating leads to a stronger propensity to stay after
rewarded trials, while impaired updating of unrewarded trials decreases the
propensity to switch after such trials. (F) Opposite to (C), a shift toward model-
based control is expressed by enhanced sensitivity to the task structure.
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Figure 3. Results Computational Learning Model
(A) Group-averaged parameter differences in the computational learning
model between L-DOPA and placebo. Parameter w represents a measure of
model-based over model-free control. Error bars represent SEM. (B) Single-
subject data for parameter values in (A). Each data point represents the
parameter value of a single subject. Subjects above the diagonal (circles) had
higher parameter values in the L-DOPA compared to placebo condition, while
subjects below (crosses) had smaller parameter values. The relative degree
of model-based control was higher in the L-DOPA condition in 14 out of
18 subjects. See Figure S1 and Table S1 for validation of the winning model
and Table S2 for model comparison details.
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Dopamine Enhances Model-Based Behaviorsubject and drug state after applying logistic or exponential
transformations to bounded model parameters (a, b, p, u)
to gain Gaussian distributed fitted parameter values (a, b, p,
w), permitting the use of parametric tests for differences
between sessions. All reported p values are from two-tailed
paired t tests.420 Neuron 75, 418–424, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.In line with the stay-switch results, we found a significant
increase in the model-based weighting parameter w, p =
0.005, (positive in 14 out of 18 subjects) and a trend-level
decrease in the perseverance parameter p, p = 0.06, under
L-DOPA compared to placebo. Learning rate a, p = 0.45, and
softmax temperature b, p = 0.34, did not differ between drug
states (Figure 3). We note that, overall, fitted parameter
values were in a similar range as those in Daw et al. (2011)
(Table 1). As model-based choice is superior to model-free
choice in this task, we found a significant positive correlation
between subjects’ relative degree of model-based control (w)
and total earnings, r = 0.4, p = 0.01 (Figure S2). There was no
evidence for differences in drowsiness or general alertness
(Bond et al., 1974) between sessions (paired t tests over each
score; smallest p > 0.1) or in average response times between
drug states (first stage RTL-DOPA = 593 ms, RTPlacebo = 586 ms;
paired t test, p = 0.70).
Note that in the preceding analysis we employed the same
computational models as the authors in the original study
utilizing this task (Daw et al., 2011). We also constructed
additional computational models to further explore the observed
shift in control and to examine whether dopamine asserts its
effect predominantly on the model-free or model-based system.
Some studies have suggested that dopamine levels might
have differential effects on positive and negative updating
(Frank et al., 2004; Pessiglione et al., 2006). We therefore tested
a model with separate learning rates for positive (a+) and nega-
tive (a) updating. The learning rates were not significantly
different between L-DOPA and placebo (paired t test: a+, p =
0.52 and a, p = 0.43). The use of the same values at the second
stage for both model-free and model-based systems ignores
evidence that model-based and model-free learning use
different neural structures (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010;
Table 1. Best-Fitting Parameter Estimates, ShownSeparately for
Both Drug Conditions as Median and Quartiles across Subjects
a b p u
Placebo
25th percentile 0.25 3.4 0.63 0.07
Median 0.45 5.4 1.37 0.58
75th percentile 0.57 7.3 2.20 0.79
L-DOPA
25th percentile 0.25 1.8 0.28 0.14
Median 0.37 4.7 0.70 0.78
75th percentile 0.59 7.7 1.50 0.95
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stage values separately. To test this, we implemented a model
containing separate representations of second-stage values
and learning rates for the model-based and model-free system.
The model-based learning rate was higher than the model-free
learning rate (p = 0.001). However, concurring with the results
from our original computational implementation, there was no
change in either learning rate with drug condition (a model-free
p = 0.33, model-based p = 0.76). An alternative computational
implementation of model-free RL, the actor-critic model, learns
values and action policies separately (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
To test whether L-DOPA might alter updating of action policies
rather than impacting on value updating, we implemented
a hybrid model in which the original model-free component
was replaced with an actor-critic component. In line with the
absence of a significant difference in the parameters of the orig-
inal model-free implementation, this analysis did not show any
significant difference between drug states in either the learning
parameter a (p = 0.17) for state value or h for policy updating
(p = 0.51).
Finally, we tested for order effects by repeating the analyses
with session instead of drug as factor. There were no significant
differences in either stay-switch behavior (repeated-measures
ANOVA; main effect of session F(1,17) < 1; session 3 reward,
F(1,17) < 1; session 3 (reward 3 transition), F(1,17) = 1.37,
p = 0.26) or parameter fits in the computational analysis with
session as a grouping factor (two-tailed paired t tests; a:
p = 0.15; b: p = 0.31; p: p = 0.97; w: p = 0.37). Thus, our results
provide compelling evidence for an increase in the relative
degree of model-based behavioral control under conditions of
elevated dopamine.
DISCUSSION
It is widely believed that both model-free and model-based
mechanisms contribute to human choice behavior. In this study,
we investigated a modulatory role of dopamine in the arbitration
between these two systems and provide evidence that L-DOPA
increases the relative degree of model-based over model-free
behavioral control.
The use of systemic L-DOPA combined with a purely behav-
ioral approach precludes strong conclusions about the precise
physiological underpinnings of the observed shift to model-
based control. Nevertheless, we provide a number of possibleexplanations for how this effect might be mediated in the brain
that could guide further studies. First, increased dopamine levels
may improve performance of component processes of a model-
based system. Dopamine has previously been associated with
an enhancement of cognitive functions such as reasoning, rule
learning, set shifting, planning, and working memory (Clatworthy
et al., 2009; Cools and D’Esposito, 2011; Cools et al., 2002;
Lewis et al., 2005; Mehta et al., 2005), and these processes
are most likely coopted during model-based decisions. Previous
theoretical considerations link a system’s performance to its
relative impact on behavioral control, such that the degree of
model-based versus model-free control depends directly on
the relative certainties of both systems (Daw et al., 2005).
Increased processing capacity might enhance certainty in the
model-based system and would thus predict the observed shift
in behavioral control that we detail here.
Second, a more conventional account is that increased dopa-
mine exerts its effect through an impact on a model-free system.
According to this view, excessive dopamine disrupts model-free
reinforcement learning, which is then compensated for by
increased model-based control. Specifically, elevated tonic
dopamine levels may reduce the effectiveness of negative
prediction errors (Frank et al., 2004; Voon et al., 2010). However,
this explanation fails to account for the results presented here.
First, a disruption of negative prediction errors under L-DOPA
would change stay probabilities independent of transition type
(Figure 2E), which is incompatible with the drug3 reward3 tran-
sition interaction observed here (Figure 2B). Second, any such
model-free impairment would have impacted learning of
second-stage values (which in this task are assumed to be learnt
via prediction errors irrespective of the control on the first stage;
Daw et al., 2011) and manifested in noisier choices or altered
learning rates. We did not observe such an effect on the softmax
temperature b or learning rate a. This effect was still absent when
we fit alternative models employing separate learning rates and
temperatures for the first and second stage or separate learning
rates for positive and negative updating. Together, this argues
against the idea that L-DOPA in our study enhanced the relative
degree of model-based behavior through a disruption of the
model-free system.
Finally, dopamine could facilitate switching from one type of
control to the other akin to the way it decreases behavioral
persistence (Cools et al., 2003). It is known that over the course
of instrumental learning, the habitual system assumes control
from the goal-directed system (Adams, 1982; Yin et al., 2004),
but the goal-directed system can quickly regain control in
unforeseen situations (Isoda and Hikosaka, 2011; Norman and
Shallice, 1986). This could explain why we observe a stronger
switch to model-based behavior after unrewarded trials: the
lack of rewarding feedback may prompt the need to reevaluate
available options and invest more energy to prevent another
nonrewarding event by switching to model-based control. Note
that it is possible and indeed likely that a facilitation of control
switching under L-DOPA works in concert with an enhancement
of the model-based system itself.
The predominant view in computational and systems neuro-
science holds that phasic dopamine underlies model-free
behavior by encoding reward prediction errors. On the otherNeuron 75, 418–424, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 421
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Dopamine Enhances Model-Based Behaviorhand, animal and cognitive approaches emphasize a role for
dopamine in model-based behavior such as planning and
reasoning (Berridge, 2007; Clatworthy et al., 2009; Cools and
D’Esposito, 2011; Robbins and Everitt, 2007). Contrasting with
interest in the model-free and model-based system separately
is the lack of data on the arbitration between these two behav-
ioral controllers. Our experiment fills this gap by pitting model-
free and model-based control against each other in the same
task and in so doing provides strong evidence for an involvement
of dopamine in the arbitration between model-free and model-
based control over behavior.
Our findings advocate an effect of L-DOPA on the arbitration
between model-based and model-free control, without a modu-
lation of the model-free system itself. Note that the majority of
studies reporting enhanced or impaired learning under dopami-
nergic drugs used either Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients
(Frank et al., 2004; Voon et al., 2010) or involved agents that
primarily act at D2 receptors (Cools, 2006; Frank and O’Reilly,
2006). In contrast with these studies, we did not find evidence
for any modulation by L-DOPA of model-free learning rates or
indeed evidence of impaired model-free choices. These devia-
tions might partly be explained by PD patients’ more severely
reduced dopamine availability off their dopamine replacement
therapy (in contrast to our placebo condition) and the much
higher doses of medication involved in PD treatment. Consistent
with this explanation is that the effect of L-DOPA on instrumental
learning in healthy volunteers was found to be significant only
when compared to an inhibition of the dopamine system (via
haloperidol) but not when compared to placebo (Pessiglione
et al., 2006).
Our task does not allow us to dissociate between learning and
performance effects. Previous work has suggested interactions
between model-based and model-free systems during learning.
In this framework, reward prediction errors that are in line with
model-based predictions are enhanced, while reward prediction
errors that are in opposition with model-based predictions are
attenuated (confirmation bias) (Biele et al., 2011; Doll et al.,
2009, 2011). In support of this, neuroimaging findings based
on the present task showed evidence that ventral striatal
BOLD at the time of feedback, typically associated with predic-
tion error signals, contained a model-based component (Daw
et al., 2011). This raises the possibility that model-free and
model-based systems are not segregated systems whose influ-
ence is weighted at the time of choice. Instead, choices could
also be made by a model-free system in which learning is modu-
lated by transition probabilities. In this study, we cannot unam-
biguously differentiate between these accounts and further
fine-grained investigations, in part motivated by the present
data, are required to understand this complex issue.
Dopamine itself is a precursor to norepinephrine and epineph-
rine, potentially contributing to the observed effects. However,
L-DOPA administration causes a linear increase in dopamine
levels in the brain without affecting norepinephrine levels (Everett
and Borcherding, 1970). Another possibility would be that
L-DOPA exerts effects through interactions with the serotonin
system. Such an interaction, between dopamine and serotonin,
is known to play a role in a range of higher-level cognitive func-
tions (Boureau and Dayan, 2011).422 Neuron 75, 418–424, August 9, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc.By implicating dopamine in behavioral control, we open the
door to further experiments aimed at elucidating the precise
neural mechanisms underlying the arbitration between both
controllers. While theoretical considerations afford a number of
ways for how this arbitration might be implemented in the brain
(Daw, 2011; Keramati et al., 2011), our results provide empirical
evidence that dopamine influences the relative degree between
model-free and model-based control.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Eighteen healthy males (mean age: 23.3 [SD: 3.4]) participated in two separate
sessions. Data from two additional subjects were not included in the analysis
as those subjects misunderstood instructions and performed at chance level.
The UCL Ethics committee approved the study and subjects gave written
informed consent before both sessions.
Dopamine Drug Manipulation
Subjects were tested in a double-blind, fully counterbalanced, repeated-mea-
sures setting on L-DOPA (150 mg L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine / 37.5 mg
benserazide; Madopar, Roche) and on placebo (500 mg calcium carbonate;
Calcit, Procter and Gamble) dispersed in orange squash. The task was admin-
istered 55.0 (SD: 4.7) min after drug administration. Sessions one and twowere
approximately 1 week apart (at least 4, but no more than 14 days), with both
sessions at the same time of day. All subjects except one participated in the
morning to minimize time-of-day effects. We assessed drug effects on self-
reported mental state using a computerized visual analog scale immediately
before starting the task (Bond et al., 1974).
Task
We drew on Daw et al. (2011)’s two-step choice task to assess the relative
degree of model-based versus model-free decision making. Our version of
the task was identical to Daw et al.’s except for different stimulus images
(semantically irrelevant fractals), a slightly larger dynamic range of reward
probabilities, and more rapid trial timings. Subjects completed 201 trials
and were given a break after trials 67 and 134. Please see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for full task description.
Stay-Switch Behavior
Stay probabilities at the first stage (the probability to choose the same stimulus
as in the preceding trial), conditional on transition type of the previous trial
(common or uncommon), reward on the previous trial (reward or no reward),
and drug state (L-DOPA or placebo) were entered into a three-way
repeated-measures ANOVA.
Computational Modeling
We fit a previously described hybrid model (Gla¨scher et al., 2010; Daw et al.,
2011) to choice behavior. This model contains separate terms for model-
free and model-based stimulus values at the first stage. These values
are weighted by a parameter w to compute an overall value for each stimulus.
The first-stage choice is then made using a softmax function dependent
on relative stimulus values and the subject’s choice on the previous trial.
For a full description of the model, see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures.
Model Fitting
We used a hierarchical model-fitting strategy, which takes into account the
likelihood of individual subject choices ci given the individual subject parame-
ters ai, bi, pi, wi and also the likelihood of the individual subject parameters
given the parameter distribution in the overall population across conditions.
This regularizes individual subjects’ parameter fits, rendering them more
robust toward overfitting.
This two-stage hierarchical procedure is a simplified estimation strategy of
the iterative expectation  maximization (EM) algorithm (see Supplemental
Neuron
Dopamine Enhances Model-Based BehaviorExperimental Procedures for details, and for an in-depth discussion see also
Daw, 2011).
Importantly, our main results are independent of the parameter regulariza-
tion: the weighting parameter w was significantly (p = 0.02) higher in the
L-DOPA condition compared to placebo, even when testing individual subject
parameters from the maximum likelihood fit during the first step.
Parameter Covariance
Covariance between parameters would indicate that two parameters might be
redundant, potentially rendering parameter values more difficult to interpret.
There were no significant pairwise correlations between any of our parameters
across subjects (paired t tests: all individual p > 0.05).SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes two figures, two tables, and Supplemental
Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.03.042.
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